INTERNAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF AGENCIES
OAL, its authority to review agency regulations, and the six criteria upon which
its review is based were not created until
1980. (See CRLR Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring
1991) p. 44; Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter
1991) p. 38; and Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall
1990) p. 39 for background information
on this case.)
All parties have finally reached a settlement in California Chapter of the
American Physical Therapy Ass'n, et al.
v. CaliforniaState Board of Chiropractic Examiners, et al., Nos. 35-44-85 and
35-24-14 (Sacramento County Superior
Court). The parties were litigating the
validity of the Board of Chiropractic
Examiners' (BCE) adoption and OAL's
approval of section 302 of BCE's regulations, which defines the scope of chiropractic practice. On February 1, the
court approved a settlement between
BCE and the California Medical Association (CMA), which required BCE to
adopt new section 302 on an emergency
basis; OAL approved the emergency
rule on April 4. Other parties and intervenors-including the California chapter of the American Physical Therapy
Association, the Medical Board of California, and the Physical Therapy Examining Committee-initially objected to
the settlement agreement and the proposed regulation, because it includes the
practice of physical therapy within the
scope of practice of a chiropractor. However, BCE later agreed to amend the proposed regulation to include an acceptable definition of the physical therapy
which may be practiced by a chiropractor. BCE was scheduled to hold a regulatory hearing on the proposed adoption of
revised section 302 on June 20. (See
infra agency report on BCE for related
discussion.) Thus, this lengthy case ended with no disposition as to OAL's 1987
"approval in part and disapproval in
part" of section 302, which many critics
believe is outside OAL's scope of
authority. (See CRLR Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall
1987) pp. 11, 30, and 100 for background information.)
On May 29, final judgment was
entered in State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB) and the Regional
Quality Control Board, San Francisco
Region v. Office of Administrative Law,
No. 906452 (San Francisco County
Superior Court), the court holding that
the wetland rules at issue are regulations
within the meaning of the APA; the rules
are not exempt from the APA; and since
the rules were not adopted pursuant to
the APA, they are unenforceable. (See
CRLR Vol. 11, No. .2 (Spring 1991) p.
44; Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1991) p. 39;
and Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 1990) p. 164 for
background information; see supra

LEGISLATION for AB 88 (Kelley),
which would remove some of WRCB's
rulemaking proceedings from the
requirements of the APA.)
A new lawsuit, Weber v. Smith, No.
366633 (Sacramento County Superior
Court), was filed against OAL on April
25. Weber, who had filed a request for
determination from OAL in 1990, was
not satisfied with the limited scope of the
determination handed down by OAL on
March 28. OAL Determination No. 2
(March 28, 1991, Docket No. 90-004)
concluded that a regional center contracting with the Department of Developmental Services (DDS) is neither a
state agency fior an agent of the state,
and that such regional centers are not
subject to the requirements of the APA.
(See supra MAJOR PROJECTS.) Weber
is challenging OAL's finding and declaration that it is beyond OAL's jurisdiction to prevent such privately-owned and
operated community-based care centers
from embracing and implementing practices and policies which DDS would be
prohibited from enforcing without satisfying the APA's requirements.
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
Acting Auditor General: Kurt Sjoberg
(916) 445-0255
The Office of the Auditor General
(OAG) is the nonpartisan auditing and
investigating arm of the California legislature. OAG is under the direction of the
Joint Legislative Audit Committee
(JLAC), which is comprised of fourteen
members, seven each from the Assembly
and Senate. JLAC has the authority to
"determine the policies of the Auditor
General, ascertain facts, review reports
and take action thereon ...and make recommendations to the Legislature.. .concerning the state audit.. .revenues and
expenditures...." (Government Code section 10501.) OAG may "only conduct
audits and investigations approved by"
JLAC.
Government Code section 10527
authorizes OAG "to examine any and all
books, accounts, reports, vouchers, correspondence files, and other records,
bank accounts, and money or other property of any agency of the state.. .and any
public entity, including any city, county,
and special district which receives state
funds...and the records and property of
any public or private entity or person
subject to review or regulation by the
agency or public entity being audited or
investigated to the same extent that
employees of that agency or public entity have access."
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OAG has three divisions: the Financial Audit Division, which performs the
traditional CPA fiscal audit; the Investigative Audit Division, which investigates allegations of fraud, waste and
abuse in state government received
under the Reporting of Improper Governmental Activities Act (Government
Code sections 10540 et seq.); and the
Performance Audit Division, which
reviews programs funded by the state to
determine if they are efficient and cost
effective.
RECENT AUDITS:
Report No. F-005 (March 1991) contains the results of OAG's review of the
state's control of its financial activities
and its compliance with federal grant
requirements and state regulations; this
review was made as part of OAG's
examination of the state's general purpose financial statements. (See CRLR
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 1991) p. 4 5 for
background information.) The report
found that, although California has corrected some of the weaknesses in its
internal controls identified by OAG in
recent years, it has many more weaknesses to correct. The state continues to
lose millions of dollars each year
because agencies do not promptly identify and collect amounts owed to the state;
do not effectively control expenditures;
and do not manage cash to maximize
benefits to the state. According to the
report, for fiscal year 1989-90, 20 of the
24 agencies audited had weaknesses in
the controls over their financial activities.
Among other recommendations,
OAG suggested that the state uniformly
prepare its budget based on generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP);
GAAP is the preferred method of
accounting because it is a nationally recognized set of standards which improves
accountability by recognizing costs
when they occur, not when they are paid
for.
Report No. P-049 (April 1991) concerns the processing of complaints
against physicians and other health practitioners by the Medical Board of California (MBC), the Office of the Attorney
General, and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). MBC is responsible for protecting consumers from
incompetent, grossly negligent, unlicensed, or unethical medical practitioners. In addition to licensing physicians,
MBC investigates complaints against its
licensees and those of the committees
and boards of the Division of Allied
Health Professions. According to MBC,
as of June 30, 1990, 155,734 licenses
were in effect. During fiscal year 1989-90,
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the Board received 6,658 complaints
against health care practitioners, opened
2,689 investigations, and referred 378
cases to the AG's Office for discipline.
MBC's investigation and discipline of
health professionals is a lengthy process
involving the Board, the AG's Office
whose attorneys prosecute discipline
cases, and the OAH whose administrative law judges (ALJs) preside over disciplinary hearings.
Preliminarily, the Auditor General
noted that MBC's discipline system was
the object of SB 2375 (Presley) (Chapter
1597, Statutes of 1990), a wide-ranging
reform bill intended to expedite and
strengthen the process. Among other
things, the bill requires the Board to set a
goal that by January 1, 1992, it will complete investigations within an average of
six months from receipt of the complaint. After reviewing a selected sample
of MBC enforcement cases resolved
between December 1, 1989 through
November 30, 1990, OAG concluded
that the Board will not be able to meet
this goal. MBC investigations last approximately 14 months-eight months
beyond SB 2375's six-month goal. The
fact that it takes an average of 117 days
for the Medical Board to simply assign a
case to a field investigator contributes
substantially to this problem. Of the 312
cases reviewed by OAG, 22% were
unassigned for six months (180 days) or
longer.
After the Board completes its investigation and decides to file an accusation
against a health care practitioner, the
case is referred to the AG's Office,
which has set a deadline of completing
accusations within 60 days of receipt.
However, OAG found that it presently
takes the AG's Office over 200 days to
prepare an accusation.
Although the functioning of OAH
was beyond the scope of this audit, OAG
noted that it usually takes OAH an average of 264 days (from the filing of the
accusation) to complete a disciplinary
hearing. Once the hearing is completed,
the ALJ has 30 days in which to prepare
a proposed decision and forward it to
MBC's Division of Medical Quality
(DMQ) or the relevant allied health
licensing program. That entity then has
100 days in which to act on the proposed
decision.
Thus, the Auditor General found that
MBC, the AG's Office, and OAH took
an average of 2.8 years to process a discipline case, from the Board's receipt of
the complaint to its final disciplinary
decision. Even if MBC were to meet the
SB 2375- imposed six-month investigation goal and the AG's Office were to
meet its self-imposed 60-day goal for the

preparation of an accusation, the physician discipline process would still take
1.7 years.
OAG made other findings as well,
including the following:
-Of 180 cases closed by MBC as
without merit, 17% were closed for reasons that were not sufficient for concluding that the cases lacked merit.
-OAG found no evidence of supervisory approval for 15% of the 150 cases
closed without merit involving allegations of physician negligence, incompetence, or drugs.
-MBC does not maintain its central
file of all licensee names and complaint
history as required by law, and is not
always able to obtain complete case file
documentation from its central file.
-MBC's toll-free complaint telephone
number (1-800-MED-BD-CA) is not
easily available to the public in some
areas of the state.
OAG recommends that MBC evaluate the caseloads assigned to its investigators to determine the optimal caseload
that would allow them to complete
investigations more promptly; seek
staffing levels that would allow that optimal caseload level; seek legislation
authorizing it to take disciplinary action
against a physician who fails to provide
requested medical records within a reasonable period as determined by the
Board; require MBC supervisors to
approve a decision to close a case without merit if the case involves alleged
negligence or incompetence; maintain
case files, for cases closed with merit, in
its central file at headquarters; and
ensure that all telephone companies in
all cities and counties throughout the
state have the listing for its toll-free
complaint number.
Report P-022 (May 1991) discusses
whether functions of certain state entities
which regulate professions may be performed at lower cost or more efficiently,
or both, by other state entities which provide such services. The report assumes
that the centralization of services or
functions-that is, having one large entity perform functions for a number of
smaller entities-results in potential
benefits such as decreased costs and
increased efficiency in work performance. The report notes that 50 regulatory entities in the state regulate various
professions; 37 of these are located within the Department of Consumer Affairs
(DCA). To varying degrees, all 50 regulatory entities are generally responsible
for protecting consumers from dishonest
or incompetent practitioners. To meet
these responsibilities, the regulatory
entities may establish qualifications for
licensure, administer examinations,

review license applications, and, as necessary, initiate disciplinary action.
OAG stated that many of the functions of the 50 regulatory entities surveyed are either already centralized or
are being performed in such a manner
that the entities should already be realizing the potential benefits of centralization. For example, the 37 entities within
DCA and four regulatory entities in four
other departments all rely on centralized
services provided by their parent agencies to accomplish many of their functions. In addition, OAG determined that
four very large, independent regulatory
entities (the California Horse Racing
Board, the State Bar of California, the
Department of Insurance, and the
Department of Real Estate), because of
their size, should already be able to realize the benefits of centralization. Also,
four small,'independent regulatory entities rely on large state agencies to
accomplish certain functions.
To determine whether certain DCA
agencies could realize any benefit from
having DCA perform certain functions,
OAG identified for examination various
functions which eleven of the entities
currently provide for themselvesincluding license renewal, complaint
tracking, and investigative services. Of
the eleven agencies identified for identification, OAG determined that three
entities (the Board of Guide Dogs for the
Blind, the Athletic Commission, and the
Cemetery Board) properly do not use
DCA's automated license renewal system because they do not have enough
licensees to clearly necessitate its use.
OAG also decided to review the complaint tracking systems of five DCA
entities to determine whether the regulatory entities have adequate means for
tracking complaints from initial receipt
through final resolution to help ensure
prompt resolutions to consumer complaints. The five entities chosen for
review were the Cemetery Board, the
Athletic Commission, the Board of Certified Shorthand Reporters, the Board of
Registration for Geologists and Geophysicists, and the Board of Examiners
of Nursing Home Administrators; however, OAG did not review complaint
tracking at the Athletic Commission
because, according to its executive officer, the Commission does'not receive
consumer complaints.
Thus, of the four DCA regulatory
entities reviewed by OAG which do not
use DCA's automated complaint and
enforcement tracking system, OAG
determined that none receive enough
complaints to clearly necessitate use of
the DCA's automated system for tracking complaints. OAG then reviewed the
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complaint tracking systems utilized by
these four entities, and determined that
each entity's system generally provided
sufficient information to enable the entity to track its complaints, although OAG
noted that unspecified problems exist
with some aspects of one of the entities'
system.
OAG also reviewed the costs of
investigations conducted by four DCA
entities (the Board of Pharmacy, the
Board of Dental Examiners, the Board of
Funeral Directors and Embalmers, and
the Cemetery Board) which do not use
DCA's Division of Investigation (DOI)
to perform their investigations. Analyzing only the cost (and not quality) of the
agencies' investigations, OAG concluded that all four of these regulatory entities incurred lower nominal costs per
hour for investigations in fiscal year
1989-90 than if they had used DOI to
perform their investigations.
Based on its review of the 50 regulatory entities, OAG concluded that there
appear to be limited opportunities for
these entities to further realize the potential benefits of centralization.
Report No. C-775 (May 1991) evaluates the cost-effectiveness of the state's
pilot Medi-Cal Therapeutic Drug Utilization Review (TDUR) program,
which is operated by the state Department of Health Services (DHS). AB
2606 (Chapter 1340, Statutes of 1987)
established a pilot "open formulary" and
drug utilization review program in the
Medi-Cal program. A formulary is simply a list of drugs. California has traditionally used a "pseudo closed formulary" approach to monitor drug usage and
contain costs within the Medi-Cal program. A "closed formulary" system provides that no drugs may be prescribed if
they are not on the list; a "pseudo closed
formulary" system provides that drugs
not on the list may be prescribed if prior
authorization is obtained; and under an
"open formulary" system, all drugs may
be prescribed, and no prior authorization
by Medi-Cal is required. Chapter 456,
Statutes of 1990, allowed California to
change from a pseudo closed formulary
to a list of contract drugs; only drugs
whose manufacturers have a contract
with the state are included on the list.
The implementation of this change was
accomplished on a statewide basis; the
new system was implemented in all California counties, including those counties which were part of the TDUR pilot
program.
Many in the medical community
believe that a TDUR program, which is
essentially a tool for evaluating the therapeutic outcomes of prescription drugs,
is an effective means of improving the
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health of Medi-Cal-eligible individuals
so that the incidence of institutionalization is reduced. As a result, health care
costs are expected to decline under such
programs. The intent of California's AB
2606 pilot TDUR program was to test
this hypothesis. An experiment was
designed so that health care costs for
Medi-Cal eligibles could be compared
for a test group receiving TDUR intervention in three counties, versus a control group in two counties for whom the
intervention did not occur.
The report found that the pilot TDUR
program had a direct impact resulting in
decreased utilization of drugs, outpatient
services, and hospital care for a small
group of Medi-Cal recipients during the
review period; however, improvements
were not noted for long-term care
patients. OAG's findings indicated that
the pilot program was not cost-effective,
and that the TDUR program, as it is
presently operated, would not be cost
beneficial for the state. However, OAG
noted that the potential may exist for a
TDUR program to provide an effective
means of controlling Medi-Cal costs,
and made various recommendations for
improving the cost-effectiveness of the
current TDUR program.
Report No. P-961 (May 1991) concerns the delivery of care provided by
the Department of Developmental Services to minors residing in the seven
developmental centers throughout the
state. The Department is responsible for
administering the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, which
seeks to ensure that services are provided to persons with developmental disabilities and that those services are
planned and provided as part of a continuum of care which is sufficient to meet
the needs of developmentally disabled
persons regardless of their age or handicap. According to the Lanterman Act,
developmental disabilities include mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
and autism.
The report states that the Department
needs to ensure that developmental center staff obtain proper consents and
approvals before using physical or
chemical restraints on clients; revise the
local minimum staffing guidelines at
each developmental center; take appropriate action to minimize the diversions
of direct care staff which require them to
perform nonclient duties; and ensure that
staff at the developmental centers are
recording the clients' progress toward
reaching objectives listed in their individual program plans and their individualized education programs.
Other Reports. During the past few
months, OAG has also issued the follow-
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ing reports: Federaland State Equity in
EDD Owned Buildings (Report No. F025, March 1991); The CaliforniaExposition and State Fair's FinancialStatus
For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1990 (Report No. F-025, April 1991);
The Martin Luther King Jr. Family
Health Center Needs To Improve Its
FinancialOperations (Report No. P021, April 1991); Public Reports of
Investigation Completed by the Office of
the Auditor General from August 1,
1989 through December 31, 1990
(Report No. 1-116, April 1991); Some
Animal Control Agencies Need to
Improve Their Managementfor Funds
Available for Dog and Cat Population
Control (Report P-035,. May 1991);
Portable Classrooms in California
School Districts: Their Safety, Uses,
Cost, and The Time It Takes to Acquire
Them (Report P-977, May 1991); and
Status of Franchise Tax Board/Board of
Equalization Tax Settlements (Report F031, May 1991).
LEGISLATION:
SB 1132 (Maddy), as introduced
March 8, would require the Auditor
General to complete audits in accordance with the "Government Auditing
Standards" issued by the Comptroller of
the United States. This bill is still pending in the Senate Rules Committee.
LITIGATION:
On March 27, the California Supreme
Court agreed to hear Legislature v. Eu,
No. SO 19660, the constitutional challenge to Proposition 140 brought by the
legislature and several individuals and
legislators. Among other things, Proposition 140, which was approved by the
voters in November 1990, limits the
number of terms which may be served
by state lawmakers and cuts the legislature's budget by approximately 40%.
The mandatory budget cut was scheduled to take effect on July 1. Earlier this
year, the legislature implemented a
"golden handshake" program which
resulted in the departure of 600 legislative employees, including some of the
most experienced and knowledgeable
consultants and aides.
However, in a motion for stay of
Proposition 140 filed in early June, the
legislature claimed that the salary savings from the "golden handshake" program were insufficient, and that it would
be forced to shut down the Office of the
Auditor General and the Legislative
Analyst's Office. The motion seeks a
stay of the provision which would cut
approximately $70 million from the legislature's budget, based upon the argument that it would be too difficult to
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retrieve all the laid-off employees
should the initiative eventually be invalidated. The term limits provision would
remain intact, pending the Supreme
Court's ruling on the merits of the initiative, which is expected this fall. At this
writing, with the jobs of 160 OAG
employees on the line, the motion for
stay is pending before the California
Supreme Court.

COMMISSION ON CALIFORNIA
STATE GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION AND
ECONOMY (LITTLE HOOVER
COMMISSION)
Executive Director:
Jeannine L. English
Chairperson:Nathan Shapell
(916) 445-2125
The Little Hoover Commission was
created by the legislature in 1961 and
became operational in the spring of
1962. (Government Code sections 8501
et seq.) Although considered to be within the executive branch of state government for budgetary purposes, the law
states that "the Commission shall not be
subject to the control or direction of any
officer or employee of the executive
branch except in connection with the
appropriation of funds approved by the
Legislature." (Government Code section
8502.)
Statute provides that no more than
seven of the thirteen members of the
Commission may be from the same
political party. The Governor appoints
five citizen members, and the legislature
appoints four citizen members. The balance of the membership is comprised of
two Senators and two Assemblymembers.
This unique formulation enables the
Commission to be California's only truly
independent watchdog agency. However, in spite of its statutory independence,
the Commission remains a purely advisory entity only empowered to make recommendations.
The purpose and duties of the Commission are set forth in Government
Code section 8521. The Code states: "It
is the purpose of the Legislature in creating the Commission, to secure assistance
for the Governor and itself in promoting
economy, efficiency and improved service in the transaction of the public business in the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
executive branch of the state government, and inmaking the operation of all

state departments, agencies, and instrumentalities and all expenditures of public funds, more directly responsive to the
wishes of the people as expressed by
their elected representatives...."
The Commission seeks to achieve
these ends by conducting studies and
making recommendations as to the adoption of methods and procedures to
reduce government expenditures, the
elimination of functional and service
duplication, the abolition of unnecessary
services, programs and functions, the
definition or redefinition of public officials' duties and responsibilities, and the
reorganization and or restructuring of
state entities and programs. The Commission holds hearings about once a
month on topics that come to its attention from citizens, legislators, and other
sources.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Skilled Nursing Homes: Care Without Dignity (April 1991) is part of the
Commission's long-term study of the
quality of care available to California's
elderly population. Related Commission
reports have reviewed community care
(1983) and residential care (1989 and
1991) for the elderly. (See CRLR Vol.
11, No. 2 (Spring 1991) p. 47 for
details.)
According to the Commission,
almost 120,000 Californians are spending their final days in 1,200 skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) which are licensed
and monitored by the California Department of Health Services (DHS). SNFs
provide care for elderly residents who
are no longer independent and need constant care. California spends almost $2
billion in Medi-Cal payments to SNFs,
which is 25% of the health care budget
for about 2% of the caseload.
Since 1976, the Commission has
periodically examined DHS' role in regulating skilled nursing facilities and published The Medical Care of California's
Nursing Home Residents: Inadequate
Care, Inadequate Oversight (February
1989). (See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring
1989) pp. 38-39 for a summary of this
report.) Since then, the Commission has
successfully sponsored legislative
reforms to improve standards, strengthen
fines and penalties for violations, protect
complainants' rights, and create more
public access to SNF information.
Despite legislative victories, however, the Commission expressed continuing concern that the system is faltering
and the elderly are still subject to abuse
and neglect in SNFs. The Commission
based its 1991 report on complaints,
interviews with experts, and investiga-

tion of records. Complaints from advocates for the elderly and from the families and friends of SNF residents cite
limited enforcement of regulations, the
close association between the state
licensing process and the nursing home
industry, and the state's failure to implement federal nursing home reforms
required by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 87). (See
infra agency report on BOARD OF
EXAMINERS OF NURSING HOME
ADMINISTRATORS for related discussion; see also CRLR Vol. 11, No. 2
(Spring 1991) pp. 94-95 for background
information.) According to the Commission,'California dismissed the .OBRA 87
regulations as little more than added
paperwork that would cost upward of
$400 million without improving the
quality of SNF care in California. But
the Commission maintains that wellfounded complaints indicate the need for
California to meet OBRA 87's improved
standards.
In its report, the Commission made
three findings and seven recommendations. First, the report found that California, by failing to implement the OBRA
87 reforms, has threatened the health,
safety, and well-being of SNF residents
and jeopardized federal funding for
Medi-Cal. The report recommended that
California take immediate steps to comply with the federal standards.
Second, the report noted that 68% of
California SNF residents are physically
or chemically restrained, a statistic that
greatly exceeds that of any other state,
and found that DHS has failed to define
a resident's right to informed consent for
restraints. The report recommended legislation to ensure that SNF residents participate in treatment planning and have
an opportunity to give (or withhold)
informed consent for physical and chemical restraints. Other recommendations
include legislative restriction of medications frequently abused in SNFs; DHS
creation of a Medi-Cal drug approval
system for long-term care patients; and
DHS tracking of.the number of SNF residents who are restrained, those unable
to give informed consent, and those
without a representative.
Additionally, the Commission noted
that since its first 1983 SNF study, it has
strongly recommended a meaningful
system of citations and fines to support
the state's efforts to improve the quality
of care provided to the elderly. Despite
some reforms, the Commission still
found evidence of a massive amount of
uncollected fines, uneven enforcement
of violations, a widespread perception
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